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We deﬁne social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating one’s disap-
proval, at some personal cost, for the violation of widely-held norms (e.g.,
don’t free ride). Social reciprocity diﬀers from standard notions of reci-
procity because social reciprocators intervene whenever a norm is violated
a n dd on o tc o n d i t i o ni n t e r v e n t i o no np o t e n t i a lf u t u r ep a y o ﬀs, revenge, or
altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative
response. Our experiment conﬁrms the existence of social reciprocity and
demonstrates that more socially eﬃcient outcomes arise when reciprocity
can be expressed socially. Too provide theoretical foundations for social
reciprocity, we show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of
the two stable equilibria of an evolutionary game with selection drift.
Keywords: reciprocity, norm, experiment, public good, learning, evo-
lution
11I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
Four decades have passed since the infamous murder of Kitty Genovese in
Queens, New York, in 1964, but for those who lament the state of urban life
in the United States then and now, her name still resonates. It is our view,
however, that what most shocks us about the crime is not the appearance of
widespread indiﬀerence to the pain of others, but rather that such indiﬀerence is
still the exception, not the rule, despite standard assumptions about the charac-
ter of homo economicus. In particular, we suspect that our desire to "punish"
in this case is not limited to her murderer but extends, albeit in a diﬀerent sense
and to a smaller extent, to her neighbors.
The subsequent research of psychologists and sociologists on "bystander in-
tervention," much of it motivated by the Genovese case, provides some support
for this interpretation. Borofsky et al (1971) and Shotland and Straw (1976),
for example, demonstrated that a signiﬁcant number of people will intervene
in a seemingly severe altercation between two people even though the one to
intervene is not being harmed, nor is there any reason to expect that the one
to intervene will receive any payoﬀ from doing so. In the former, 29 percent
intervened in situations in which two confederates of the experimenter staged
an altercation that escalated into a physical ﬁght. The latter found that a
much higher proportion, 65 percent, intervened when a male confederate pre-
tended to assault a female confederate, but also that this number dwindled to
19 percent when the two confederates seemed to be married. (The diﬀerence
was attributed to diﬀerences in the costs of intervention: Shotland and Straw
concluded that bystanders believed that husbands were more likely to stay and
ﬁght.)
In economic environments, intervention and punishment are often important
in social dilemmas, for example, the provision of local public goods, common
pool resource extraction or team production. Despite strong incentives to free
ride on the eﬀorts of others, the members of groups who confront such dilem-
mas are sometimes adept at attenuating incentive problems without external
intervention. Communities often develop rules that make contributing and free-
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2riding transparent (Ostrom, 1992), but perhaps more importantly community
members are also often willing to incur costs to monitor and punish behavior
that beneﬁts the individual but harms the group (e.g., Acheson, 1988). Acts
of this kind tend to maintain or increase the eﬃciency of social interactions so
one might posit that monitoring is in the interests of group members. Indeed, it
may be the case that if free riders respond by contributing more in the future,
the beneﬁts that accrue to monitoring and punishing may exceed the individual
costs, measured perhaps in terms of possible retaliation. However, even in this
case we know that punishers can do better by free riding on the punishment
meted out by other monitors. In fact, by the same logic that not contributing
dominates contributing to a public good in one-shot interactions (Olson, 1965),
there is no logic by which narrowly self-interested agents monitor and punish.
A number of solutions to this paradox have been oﬀered. Axelrod’s (1984)
famous tournament, for example, illustrates what can happen when interac-
tions are repeated. If there is some chance that the interaction will continue
for another period and if those involved are not too impatient, strategies that
punish (tit-for-tat, for example) can support Nash equilibria in which individ-
uals cooperate and punish those who do not. (This is of course the intuition
behind the so-called Folk Theorem.) One cannot, however, explain cooperation
or punishment in one-shot interactions on this basis, and the proposition that
these are simply "mistakes" by individuals who believed otherwise is diﬃcult to
rationalize in the context of the systematic behavior observed in experiments.
Fehr and Fischbacher (2001) conclude, in fact, that even a naïve decision maker
will ﬁnd the diﬀerence between one-shot and repeated encounters a salient one.
Other researchers have considered alternative representations of preferences
and the inﬂuence of social norms. For example, Kandal and Lazear (1992) show
that contributions to team production can be sustained at considerable levels if
team members are motivated by peer pressure. Altruists may also punish free
riders because they want to increase the payoﬀs of the other, contributing, group
members. Reciprocity may also cause players to retaliate against free riders,
either because their cooperation has been exploited and/or the lower levels of
public goods provision impose material costs (Bowles et al 2001). However,
reciprocity (or conditional cooperation) by itself is unable to maintain coopera-
tion without punishment because reciprocators have only one way to show their
unhappiness with free riders - they withhold contributions themselves. This im-
plies that even a small amount of free riding can ruin group-level cooperation
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
3In this paper we are interested in understanding the origins, limits, and so-
cial implications of individuals who incur costs to express their disapproval of
antisocial behavior. Our focus is on norm-driven reciprocity and, in particular,
on the willingness of individuals to punish such behavior both when the pun-
isher him/herself has been harmed and when neither the punisher, nor his/her
group, has been harmed. Little or no attention has been paid to the latter, a
form of "third party punishment," in the economics literature, with the notable
exception of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). Fehr and Fischbacher ﬁnd strong
evidence of third party punishment in their three-person dictator experiment,
but suggest that our public goods-oriented design "allows for reciprocity and
strategic interactions among third parties ... [so that we] cannot rule out third
party punishment for reasons of self-interest." Under our protocol (Appendix
A), however, participants never knew who had, or had not, punished whom, so
we are conﬁdent that self-interest is not the explanation.
To motivate these two very diﬀerent scenarios, we distinguish between two
types of norm-driven reciprocal behavior based on group boundaries. Strong
Reciprocators (Bowles and Gintis, 2003; Carpenter et al., 2004; Gintis, 2000;
Sethi, 1996) punish those members of their ingroup that free-ride, where an in-
group is loosely deﬁned as the subset of individuals who beneﬁt from a speciﬁc
public good that they can all contribute to. Social Reciprocators, on the other
hand, punish free-riders even in groups to which they can neither contribute
to nor beneﬁt directly from. Social reciprocity diﬀers from strong reciprocity
because social reciprocators punish all norm violators, regardless of group aﬃl-
iation and with little regard to the social distance between punisher and norm
violator, as long as there exists some "punishment network" that connects them.
Further, while the trigger for punishment by strong reciprocators is the cost im-
plicitly imposed by a free-rider on the group, we hypothesize that the trigger
for social reciprocity is simpler. Social reciprocators just punish anyone who
violates a contribution norm, and need not be harmed directly by the free-rider.
One could also frame the relationship between strong and social reciprocity
in terms of "fuzzy boundaries": social reciprocity is the natural extension of
strong reciprocity when group boundaries are not sharp. Urban neighborhoods
are a classic example of the fuzzy boundary: it is often not obvious where
one neighborhood starts and another ends. Another example occurs in team
production when multiple teams occupy the same shop ﬂoor. In this situation,
strong reciprocity dictates that the members of a speciﬁc term punish the shirk-
ers on that team and no others. By contrast, social reciprocity requires them
4to sanction all shirkers on all teams.
The psychological experiments on bystander intervention mentioned above
oﬀer two more examples of social reciprocity, and a third can be found in Latane
and Darley’s (1970) work. In their experiment, subjects are asked to wait in a
room to be interviewed. A confederate, also in the room, steals what remains of
the show-up fee fund when the experimenter leaves. Their dependent variable
is the probability that subjects report the theft when the experimenter returns.
Because all subjects have been paid their show-up fee and therefore suﬀer no
loss when the theft occurs, strong reciprocity is not an issue. Furthermore,
since there is no expectation of a reward, there can be no instrumental reason
for intervening so, not least because the costs of turning in the confederate
could be high. Despite this, in 50% of the cases in which the subjects reported
noticing the theft, they turned in the confederate.
Identifying and understanding socially reciprocal behavioral types that indis-
criminately punish deviations from widely held norms is important because so-
cieties in which such behavior is present will be more cooperative, provide public
goods at higher levels, be better able to complete contracts in information-poor
environments, and extract from common pool resources more conscientiously
than both non-reciprocal societies and societies based on standard notions of
reciprocity alone. Provided free riders react to punishment by contributing
more and fulﬁlling commitments, societies in which people punish all rule break-
ers do better because antisocial behavior will be detected more often and pun-
ished more severely.
To develop the case for social reciprocity, we proceed as follows. In the
next section we present a summary of the existing evidence supporting the
role of reciprocity-based monitoring regimes in both ﬁeld settings and in the
experimental lab. Sections 3 through 7 outline the design and results of an
experiment we conducted to test for social reciprocity in an environment where it
is costly to punish. In the penultimate section, we then provide some theoretical
foundations for social reciprocity by showing that agents who punish outgroup
norm violators survive in one of two stable equilibria of an evolutionary public
goods game with drift. This section is important, not only because it provides
reasonable microfoundations for the social phenomenon we are interested in,
but also because the model allows us to provide an integrated approach to the
topic. We discuss the implications of our results in Section 9.
52 The Existence of Reciprocity-Based Monitor-
ing Schemes
In this section we summarize the existing evidence that suggests people, facing
social dilemmas, engage in peer monitoring. We will consider evidence from
both experiments and ﬁeld studies. While the experiments we discuss were
designed only to test for peer monitoring within speciﬁc groups, our examples
from the ﬁeld suggest that monitoring may transgress group boundaries. This
fact provides the impetus for studying social reciprocity directly.
Peer monitoring has been tested experimentally in two speciﬁc game envi-
ronments, common pool resource experiments where participants contribute by
showing restraint when extracting from a commons and voluntary contribution
experiments in which participants decide whether or not to contribute to a pub-
l i cg o o d ,t h eb e n e ﬁts of which are shared by the entire group. Ostrom et al.
(1992), using a common pool resource design, were the ﬁrst to demonstrate eﬃ-
ciency gains from peer monitoring. Their results showed that participants were
able to sustain signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains when they were allowed to punish
those who extracted too much from the commons. These ﬁndings were later
extended in Ostrom et al. (1994) and replicated in Moir (1998).
The ﬁrst public goods experiment incorporating peer monitoring was con-
ducted by Fehr and Gächter (2000) who conﬁrmed the reciprocity-based theory
of play in public goods games originating in Andreoni (1988). Andreoni’s exper-
imental design is noteworthy because it was able to diﬀerentiate learning from
reciprocity. More speciﬁcally, the design had participants play a multi-period
voluntary contribution game twice in a row (without knowing there would be
a second game). The ﬁrst play of the game resulted in the standard decay of
contributions which might suggest that players learned to free ride. However,
instead of starting at low levels of contributions, the second play began with
contributions signiﬁcantly higher than at the end of the ﬁrst play suggesting
that, rather than learning to free ride, participants withheld contributions in
the ﬁrst play to get back at free riders. When allowed to directly punish the
other group members, Fehr and Gächter showed that free riders are punished
and contributions do not decline.
The work of Fehr and Gächter has subsequently been replicated and extended
in a number of interesting directions. Bowles et al. (2001) develop a reciprocity-
based model of team production which predicts punishment in equilibrium and
6tests the model experimentally. Their results indicate that the propensity to
punish a shirking team member is directly proportional to how much harm
the shirker inﬂicts on the punisher and that shirkers respond to punishment
by contributing more in the future. Additionally, Carpenter (2004) shows the
eﬀectiveness of peer monitoring need not be attenuated in large groups. Page
and Putterman (2000) also conﬁrm that punishment is used to maintain or
increase contributions to a public good and show that communication among
players, which usually increases contributions, has mixed eﬀects when combined
with sanctions. Finally, Sefton et al. (2000) ran an experiment in which players
could reward and sanction other players. When both rewards and sanctions
are allowed, they show that initially, rewards are used, but by the end of the
experiment rewards abate and players rely mainly on sanctions.
Summarizing the results of previous experiments, we see that peer moni-
toring occurs and can be explained by the existence of reciprocally-motivated
players who punish players who inﬂict costs on them (e.g. reduced payoﬀsf r o m
the public good) by free riding.
Although the evidence is less direct than that generated in the experimental
lab, ﬁeld studies of common pool resources, team production, and on a larger
scale, neighborhoods also suggest that free riding and antisocial behavior can
be controlled by peer monitoring. For example, Acheson (1993) illustrates how
members of small, local ﬁsheries prevent over-extraction by relying on endoge-
nously evolved norms (that are often illegal) to punish over-extractors. Likewise,
the Craig and Pencavel (1995) study of plywood cooperatives and the Ghemawat
(1995) paper on a steel mini mill show that productive teams control shirking en-
dogenously without the need of supervisors. Lastly, Sampson et al. (1997) show
that, controlling for previous violence and individual characteristics, community
monitoring, which they term collective eﬃcacy, can explain diﬀerences in the
amount of antisocial behavior occurring in diﬀerent neighborhoods of Chicago.
In short, case and ﬁeld studies of actual social dilemmas indicate that groups
regulate free riding endogenously and, given existing experimental results, the
most parsimonious explanations are reciprocity-based.
The study of Sampson et al. is particularly interesting to us because neigh-
borhoods are often populated with relatively large groups and are often distin-
guished by fuzzy borders while ﬁsheries and work teams are generally smaller
and more well-deﬁned. It follows that egoistic incentives to monitor in neigh-
borhoods are low because the beneﬁts of monitoring are diﬀuse. This phenom-
enon suggests that monitoring free riders and community policing, in general,
7transgress blurry group boundaries. Therefore, the apparent eﬃciency of se-
lected communities can not be explained by egoistic reasons to punish free rid-
ers or narrowly deﬁned notions of reciprocity based on the intimacies of small
groups in which reciprocators punish transgressors who impose costs on them
directly.
3 A Social Reciprocity Experiment
We designed a public goods experiment to test for the existence of social reci-
procity and to diﬀerentiate it from other theories of punishment (i.e. strong
reciprocity and altruism). While our design is based on the standard voluntary
contribution mechanism originally used in Isaac et al. (1984), to test whether
players will punish free riders we allow players to monitor the decisions made
by other players and punish them at a cost. To diﬀerentiate social reciprocity
from other punishment explanations we developed additional design features
that provided a game environment in which only players who don’t respond to
the material costs imposed on them would punish a subset of free riders. The
speciﬁcs of our experiment are as follows.
We recruited ninety-six participants (thirty-ﬁve percent were female) in
eleven experimental sessions. The participants were assigned to twenty-four
four-person groups and each participant remained in the same group for all ten
periods of the experiment. The fact that the game lasted only ten periods was
common knowledge. Participants earned an average of $16.55 including a $5
show-up fee and a typical session lasted slightly less than an hour.
There were three treatments: a replication of the standard voluntary con-
tribution game (VCM) which we use as a control on our procedures (4 groups),
a replication of previous peer monitoring experiments in which players could
monitor and sanction other members of their group (6 groups), and our social
reciprocity treatment in which players could monitor and punish all the other
players in a session, but they only beneﬁted from their own group’s contribution
to a public good (14 groups).
The payoﬀ function for the social reciprocity treatment was similar to the
mutual monitoring incentive structure (see Bowles et al., 2001), but we aug-
mented it to account for what we will call outgroup punishment. Outgroup
punishment occurs when a member of one group sanctions a member of another
group. Likewise, ingroup punishment occurs when members of a group punish
8each other. In the VCM treatment no punishment was allowed. In the strong
reciprocity treatment no outgroup punishment was allowed and players saw only
the contributions of their group members. But, in the social reciprocity treat-
ment participants saw the contributions of all players and could punish any
other participant in the session. Punishment was costly; players paid one ex-
perimental monetary unit (EMU) to reduce the gross earnings of another player
by two EMUs.2
Imagine n players divided equally into k groups, each of whom can contribute
any fraction of their w EMU endowment to a public good, keeping the rest. Say
player i in group k free rides at rate 0 <σ k
i < 1 and contributes (1 − σk
i )w to
the public good, the beneﬁts of which are shared only by members of group k.
Each player’s contribution is revealed to all the other players in the session, who
t h e nc a np u n i s ha n yo t h e rp l a y e ra tac o s to f1E M Up e rs a n c t i o n .L e tsij be
the expenditure on sanctions assigned by player i to player j (we force sii =0 ).
Then the payoﬀ to player i in group k is:
πk
i =[ σk










/n is the average free riding rate in group k,
P
sij is player
i’s expenditure on sanctions and 2
P
sji is the reduction in i’s payoﬀ due to
the total sanctions received from the rest of the players. The variable m is the
marginal per capita return on a contribution to the public good (see Ledyard,
1995). In all sessions m was set to 0.5 and w was set to 25 EMUs.
With m =0 .5, the dominant strategy is to free ride on the contributions of
the rest of one’s group (i.e. σk
i =1for all i) because each contributed EMU
returns only 0.5 to the contributor. Also notice that if everyone in a four-person
group contributes one EMU, they all receive a return of 2 EMUs from the public
good. Therefore, these incentives form a social dilemma - group incentives are
at odds with individual incentives. Considering punishment, because sanctions
are costly to impose and their beneﬁt cannot be fully internalized (ingroup) or
cannot be internalized at all (outgroup) by the punisher, it is incredible and
therefore cannot be a component of any subgame perfect equilibrium. Because
punishment is an incredible threat, no one should fear it and therefore the
only subgame perfect equilibrium in this game is where everyone free rides and
nobody punishes. We feel, these incentives provide a stringent test of social reci-
procity. In this environment social reciprocity is expressed when players punish
2The instructions referred to "reductions" with no interpretation supplied.
9free riders outside their groups. Outgroup punishment can not be explained
by strong reciprocity because free riders in other groups inﬂict no harm on the
punisher. Outgroup punishment can also not be explained by tit-for-tat because
there are no possible future beneﬁts.
In the social reciprocity treatment each session was composed of two sepa-
rate groups playing simultaneously. A session lasted ten periods and each period
had three stages which proceeded as follows.3 In stage one players contributed
any fraction of their 25 EMU endowment in whole EMUs to the public good.
The group total contribution was calculated and reported to each player along
with his or her gross payoﬀ for the period. Participants were then shown the
contribution decisions of all the other players in the session. Figure 1 is a screen
shot of what participants saw at the second stage. Players imposed sanctions
by typing the number of EMUs they wished to spend to punish an individual
in the textbox below that player’s decision. After all players were done dis-
tributing sanctions, the experiment moved to stage three where everyone was
shown an itemized summary of their net payoﬀ (gross payoﬀ minus punishment
dealt minus punishment received) for the period. However, it is important to
note that players never knew where the punishment that they received came
from. Speciﬁcally, they never knew which individual or set of individuals pun-
ished them, nor did they know from which group punishment originated. This
anonymity of punishment is important because it prevents two phenomena that
could confound our results. First, anonymity prevents punishment feuds be-
tween individuals within a group or between groups and second, anonymity
prevents between-group reciprocity from arising.
4 Does Social Reciprocity Exist?
The ﬁrst question we wish to address is whether our participants (or a signif-
icant fraction of them) exhibit social reciprocity. Similar to other studies of
punishment in social dilemma games, an overwhelming majority of our partic-
ipants punished. Speciﬁcally, 82% of our subjects sanctioned ingroup and 50%
punished outgroup at least once. Hence, a preliminary look at our data suggests
half our participants exhibit some degree of social reciprocity.
Figure 2 presents a summary of contributions in our three treatments. The
vertical axis measures the fraction of the individual endowment (25 EMUs)
3The participant instructions are provided in Appendix A.
10Figure 1: The Social Reciprocity Treatment Punishment Screen Shot.
contributed to the public good, on average. As one can see, our baseline, VCM
treatment replicates the standard decline in contributions seen in many public
goods experiments (see Ledyard, 1995 for a survey). This implies there is noth-
ing strange about our protocol or subject pool. We also see that peer monitoring
(i.e., restricting players to ingroup punishment only) largely maintains the ini-
tial level of cooperation. This behavior is consistent with prior peer monitoring
experiments (see Bowles et al., 2001; Page and Putterman, 2000; and Sefton et
al., 2000). Interestingly, and conﬁrming our prior concerning the implications of
social reciprocity, contributions are highest when players can punish free riders
both inside and outside their groups. Further, these contribution diﬀerences
are all signiﬁcant at better than the 99% level.4 However, there appears to
be an end-game eﬀect in contributions. Contributions drop substantially from
round eight to round ten in both punishment treatments, but players in the
4We assess this by regressing group total contributions on treatment indicator variables
and accounting for the upper and lower limits of contributions using the Tobit procedure
and individual group heterogeneity by including random eﬀects. The resulting estimate is:
Contgroup =5 1 .07+24.75Social+15.05Strong and both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 99%































































Figure 2: Average Contributions (VCM is the standard voluntary contribution
mechanism, 4 groups; Strong Reciprocity is where only ingroup punishment
is allowed, 6 groups; and Social Reciprocity is where players can punish both
ingroup and outgroup, 14 groups).
social reciprocity treatment react less to the endgame. Despite the end-game
eﬀect, our ﬁrst major result is that social reciprocity exists and is associated
with increased contributions to a public good.
Concerning punishment expenditures, the ﬁrst thing to notice in Figure 3 is
that our strong reciprocity treatment seems to elicit more ingroup punishment
than the social reciprocity treatment. However, one should be careful drawing
this conclusion because, as was just mentioned, contributions are signiﬁcantly
higher in the social reciprocity treatment which means less punishment was war-
ranted. Our second observation is that within the social reciprocity treatment
it appears players spend more resources punishing ingroup than outgroup play-
ers. However, while this appears to be the case when looking at Figure 3, the
pooled average diﬀerence between ingroup and outgroup sanctions (including
all those cases when no punishment was levied) is not highly signiﬁcant, t=-































































Strong Reciprocity Ingroup Punishment
Social Reciprocity Ingroup Punishment
Social Reciprocity Outgroup Punishment
Figure 3: Average Expenditures on Punishment (VCM is the standard voluntary
contribution mechanism, 4 groups; Strong Reciprocity is where only ingroup
punishment is allowed, 6 groups; and Social Reciprocity is where players can
punish both ingroup and outgroup, 14 groups).
KS=0.03, p=0.14.5 Hence, we conclude that ingroup punishment is only mar-
ginally greater than outgroup punishment in our Social reciprocity treatment
which begets the question: Is there a common trigger of ingroup and outgroup
punishment? We return to this question in the next section.
However, to show that social reciprocity, as we deﬁne it, exists we simply
need to show that outgroup punishment occurs, and it does. The simple test of
whether the mean level of outgroup punishment including all the cases where
people did not punish outgroup (but not controlling for contributions) is sig-
niﬁcantly greater than zero shows we can not reject the hypothesis that social
reciprocity exists, t=8.57, p<0.01.
5The KS statistic refers to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for diﬀerences in cumulative
distributions.
135 Punishment, Norm Violations, and Reciprocity
Now that we have established that social reciprocity occurs in our experiment,
we wish to examine its origins. To do so we conducted a regression analysis
of player punishment decisions. Because we hypothesize that the social reci-
procity motivation for punishment is based on a simple normative impulse to
punish rule breakers while strong reciprocal reasons to punish are based on the
harm inﬂicted on another group member by a free rider, we model punishment
choices as a two-step process that allows us to partially separate these two forces.
Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that social reciprocity is the reason that punishers
get involved and, once involved, punishers justify how much punishment they in-
ﬂict on targets by how much harm free riders inﬂict on the punisher. In the ﬁrst
step, the social reciprocity motive, contribution norm violators trigger whether
a player gets involved or not. In the second step, the strong reciprocity motive,
players who punish condition their punishment on the impact of the violation
on their own welfare.
A natural way to model this decision process econometrically is to use the
Heckman (1979) selection model. Based on the analysis of Fehr and Gächter
(2000) who demonstrate that players who make contributions that are far from
the group average (including those who contribute more than average) are more
likely to be punished, we use one’s absolute deviation from the group average
contribution, |Contj,t −Contavg,t|, as our indicator of a broken commitment to
a contribution norm. We test whether this deviation triggers socially reciprocal
punishment. Conditional on punishing, we then measure the strong reciprocal
aspect of punishment as the diﬀerence between the punisher’s contribution and
the target’s contribution, Conti,t − Contj,t, which measures the impact that a
free rider has on the payoﬀ of the punisher.
14Table 1: A Heckman Selection Model of Punishment 
(dependent variable is Punishmenti,j,t) 
  Selection Punishment 
Dependent Variable  Punish or Not?  Punishment>0 












Constant   6.696 
(4.425) 
Outgroup   1.730 
(1.832) 
Conti,t  - Contj,t   0.218 
(0.130)
+ 
(Conti,t  - Contj,t ) × Outgroup   -0.204 
(0.176) 
Rho   -0.303* 
N 3920  410 
Notes: (i) Regressions include time period fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors by group. (ii) (robust standard errors), [marginal effects 
for the selection probit]. (iii) 
+ significant at the 10% level, * 5% level, ** 
1% level. 
 
Our experiment generates a panel of punishment choices (the dependent
variable is Punishmenti,j,t: how much punisher i punishes target j in period t)
which means that we should consider individual heterogeneity in our regressions.
However, the standard procedure of including unobserved ﬁxed or random ef-
fects for our participants is not the appropriate strategy in this situation because
15individual unobserved eﬀects will be correlated with our selection indicator (see
Wooldridge, 2002, Chp. 17). As an alternative strategy we cluster errors at the
group level to account for the fact that group-member punishment decisions may
not be independent and include time period ﬁxed eﬀects to control for idiosyn-
crasies in the progression of play (e.g., an endgame eﬀect). Lastly, we consider
only the punishment decisions of players in the social reciprocity treatment be-
cause of protocol diﬀerences between the standard punishment experiment, in
which players monitor three other players, and the social reciprocity treatment
where there are seven people to monitor, four of whom are in another group.
The results of our analysis are summarized in Table 1.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 1 appear the results of our ﬁrst stage selection
regression. As hypothesized, the social reciprocity decision to punish another
player or not depends signiﬁcantly (p<0.01) on that player’s deviation from
the group average contribution. The more egregiously one breaks the group
contribution norm, the more likely one is to be punished. Speciﬁcally, each
deviation increases one’s chances by 2% and, given the mean deviation is 3.95
EMUs, the average norm-breaker has an 8% chance of getting punished in the
experiment. Also notice that, while there is no treatment eﬀect of punishing
outgroup (the coeﬃcient on the Outgroup indicator is not signiﬁcant), players
react diﬀerently to norm violations that occur outside their groups. The in-
teraction of our outgroup indicator variable and one’s absolute deviation from
the group average contribution indicates that people are approximately half as
likely to punish deviations outside their groups. This result suggests that the
norm violation motivation for punishment is weaker outside one’s immediate
group. However, this ﬁnding does not undermine the existence of social reci-
procity, it simply suggests that social reciprocity conforms to standard notions
of ingroup-outgroup behavior (Tajfel, 1981) in that ingroup violations are more
salient.
Given one has decided to punish, the second column of Table 1 indicates
that the ferocity of one’s punishment depends signiﬁcantly on the material harm
the target imposes on the punisher. Each EMU that the punisher contributes
above the target’s contribution increases the target’s punishment by 0.218 EMUs
(p<0.10). However, this motivation for punishment only appears to be strong
within groups. As we might expect, strong reciprocity plays little role in the
allocation of outgroup punishment. One can see this by ﬁrst calculating the
diﬀerential eﬀect of contribution diﬀerences on outgroup punishing (i.e., the co-
eﬃcient on the interaction), -0.204 and then summing this point estimate with
16t h eb a s e l i n ee ﬀect, 0.218. The resulting ﬁgure, 0.014, which is very close to
zero, is the eﬀect of contribution diﬀerences between a monitor and a player
in another group on the monitor’s decision of how much to punish. The fact
that this eﬀect is essentially zero indicates that players rely on social reciprocity
alone when punishing outside their groups. However, while this eﬀect conforms
to our hypotheses about punishment and reciprocity, it remains only sugges-
tive because the coeﬃcient on the interaction is not statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels (p =0 .25).6
6T h e E ﬃciency of Social Reciprocity
We conjectured at the beginning of this paper that worlds in which social reci-
procity existed would be more cooperative, in general, and would provide pub-
lic goods more eﬃciently, in particular. In this section we illustrate that this
conjecture is true and assess why social reciprocity facilitates collective action.
R e t u r n i n gt oF i g u r e2 ,w eﬁrst note that contributions are signiﬁcantly higher
in the social reciprocity treatment conﬁrming part of this conjecture — public
goods are provided at higher levels when social reciprocity can be expressed.
But our analysis so far does not allow us to claim they are provided more eﬃ-
ciently because we have not yet accounted for punishment expenditures and the
costs of being punished.
We summarize the eﬃciency of providing the public good in Figure 4. In
Figure 4 the vertical axis measures the ratio of the average net payoﬀ for par-
ticipants in a particular punishment treatment to the average payoﬀ in the
no-punishment control experiment. Hence, the heavy line at 1.0 is the bench-
mark eﬃciency of providing the public good when no punishment is allowed. In
principle, punishment is socially worthwhile only if it generates eﬃciency gains
over the situation in which no punishment is possible.
Early on, perhaps because players are becoming accustomed to the incen-
tive structure, the eﬃciency of the two punishment treatments is lower than
our benchmark, but the social reciprocity treatment is more eﬃcient than the
strong reciprocity treatment from the start. As the experiment progresses, the
relative eﬃciency of both punishment regimes increase, but there is a notice-
able diﬀerence in levels between the social reciprocity treatment and the strong
6Also notice that the correlation between the disturbances from our two stage regressions,
rho, is signiﬁcant indicating that selection is linked to allocation and our assumption about













































































Figure 4: The Eﬃciency of Social Reciprocity (We graph the ratio of average
payoﬀs in the treatments to the control. The divisor is the average payoﬀ in
the VCM, Strong Reciprocity is where only ingroup punishment is allowed, and
Social Reciprocity is where players can punish both ingroup and outgroup).
reciprocity treatment. Payoﬀs are always substantially higher in the social reci-
procity treatment than in the strong reciprocity treatment. Further, only in
period nine is the strong reciprocity treatment brieﬂym o r ee ﬃcient than the
control, but starting in period four social reciprocity allows players to achieve
sustained and growing eﬃciency gains over the control experiment. However,
period ten is a disaster in both punishment conditions because free riders, with-
out foresight, try to take advantage of the endgame and other players pummel
them.
Why does social reciprocity increase the eﬃciency of public goods provision?
We test two hypotheses that can explain the eﬃciency diﬀerences we see in
Figure 4. First, if free riders are punished more severely in the social reciprocity
treatment and punishment causes free riders to contribute more in the future,
then contributions will be higher when outgroup punishment is allowed and
social reciprocity is triggered. To test this hypothesis, we regress the total
amount of punishment accruing to player i in round t on an indicator variable for
18the social reciprocity treatment, the player’s deviation from the group average
contribution (recall the discussion of Table 1), the player’s own expenditure
on punishment, and the interaction of the player’s deviation from the group
average contribution with our treatment indicator. If our ﬁrst hypothesis about
the eﬃciency gains is supported by our data, we expect a positive coeﬃcient
on the social reciprocity indicator.7 As for our controls, we expect players
with larger deviations from the average to accrue more punishment and we also
expect that people who spend a lot on punishment themselves comply with the
contribution norm and, therefore, are not punished much themselves.8
As we mentioned before, our experiment generates a panel of punishment
decisions. Unlike the previous section, for this analysis we can account for
individual heterogeneity with unobserved eﬀe c t sa n dw ed os oi ne q u a t i o n( 1 )
of Table 2. However, to be consistent with the methodology we use in the
rest of our analysis, we also estimate this relationship using robust standard
errors clustered by group and include time period ﬁxed eﬀe c t si ne q u a t i o n( 2 ) .
Lastly, because punishment can not be negative, we use the Tobit procedure to
estimate both equations. The coeﬃcient on the social reciprocity indicator is
large, positive, and highly signiﬁcant demonstrating that free riders are punished
more severely when players monitor all potential norm violators. We also ﬁnd
that there is no signiﬁcant correlation between the amount of punishment one
receives and how much one spends to punish others, and, in accordance with
our ﬁndings in Table 1, we see that larger deviations from the group average
correlate signiﬁcantly with more punishment, but this deviation matters less in
the social reciprocity treatments. It is also interesting to see that the results
are essentially identical when we cluster errors and use period ﬁxed eﬀects in
equation (2). Taking stock, we see that free riders are punished more in the
social reciprocity treatment, but we also need to show that free riders react
prosocially to punishment.
7We might also be content with a positive coeﬃcient on the interaction, but this would
be highly unlikely given the results of Table 1 which showed that players worried less about
deviations from the group average in other groups.
8See Carpenter et al. (2004) for an extensive discussion of the link between contributing
and punishing.
19Table 2: How Severely are Free Riders Punished? 
(dependent variable is Total Punishment Receivedi,t)  
 (1)  (2) 




















Includes individual random effects  Yes  No 
Includes time period fixed effects and 
clusters errors by group 
No Yes 
Wald chi
2  112 40 
N 680  680 
Notes: (i) Tobit regressions with lower bounds of zero. (ii) we report  
standard errors and robust standard errors in parentheses. (iii) 
+ 
significant at the 10% level, * 5% level, ** 1% level. 
 
Our contributions data is also a panel and, because we are interested in
controlling for inertial eﬀects when estimating the eﬀect of punishment on con-
tributions we include the lag of our dependent variable in the analysis. Of course
this presents a problem because the lag will be correlated with an individual’s
unobserved eﬀect (see Wooldridge, 2002, chp. 11). As above, the strategy we
use to estimate the relationship between punishment and contributions is to
incorporate time period ﬁxed eﬀects and cluster our errors at the group level.
In equation (1) of Table 3 we report the results of regressing players’ public con-
tributions on the lags of their contributions and the punishment they received.
We account for the fact that contributions are bound between 0 and 25 by using
the Tobit estimator.
20Equation (1) reveals two things about our pooled data. First, there is a
lot of inertia in contributions. Second, overall, players respond to punishment
by contributing signiﬁcantly more in the future. This second fact conﬁrms the
assumption we made about the dynamics of contributing when we formulated
our ﬁrst explanation of why public goods are provided at higher levels in the
social reciprocity treatment. Hence, we conclude that contributions are higher
in the social reciprocity treatment because free riders who react prosocially to
punishment are punished more. In fact, using equation (1) we can assess whether
it "pays" to punish in the experiment. It costs 0.5 EMUs to inﬂi c ta1E M U
punishment on a free rider. If this punishment occurs at the end of round one,
the free rider will be expected to contribute 0.34 EMUs more in round two and
the punisher’s share of this increase is 0.17 EMUs (recall that m =0 .5). This
does not seem like a very good deal. However, because of inertia, by the end
of ten periods this unit of punishment will cause a 1.25 EMU total increase in
contributions and the punisher’s share of this total eﬀect is 0.67 EMU - a much
better deal.
A second hypothesis about why there are sustained eﬃciency gains in the
social reciprocity treatment is that players respond more to punishment when
more people are monitoring. That is, contributions might also be higher in the
social reciprocity treatment because each unit of punishment has a greater eﬀect
in this treatment. In equation (2) of Table 3 we examine whether players react
more to punishment in the social reciprocity treatment. The answer is yes.
In fact, this regression indicates that increased punishment has no eﬃciency
enhancing properties in the strong reciprocity treatment; all the beneﬁts of
punishment accrue to social reciprocity players.
To make our contributions regressions more consistent with our punishment
regressions, in equation (3) we split people between those who contributed more
than the group average last period and those who contributed less than the
average last period (this leaves those who contributed at the average as the
omitted category) and add the interactions with the treatment indicator. We
c o n t i n u et os e et h a ta l lt h eb e n e ﬁts of punishment seem to accrue to players in
the social reciprocity treatment (which conforms to our hypothesis) but we also
see that punishing those people who contributed more than the group average
last period is very disruptive because this punishment causes these players to
signiﬁcantly reduce their contributions in the future.
21Table 3: Do Free Riders Respond to Punishment? 
(dependent variable is Contributioni,t) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 










Social Reciprocity × Contributioni,t-1   -0.179 
(0.292) 
 










Contributioni,t-1|Above Average     -0.239 
(0.153)** 
Social Reciprocity × Contributioni,t-1|Above Average    -0.030 
(0.191) 
Contributioni,t-1|Below Average     -0.085 
(0.155) 
Social Reciprocity × Contributioni,t-1|Below Average     -0.157 
(0.189) 
Wald chi
2  114 458 890 
N  720 720 720 
Notes: (i) Tobit regressions include time period fixed effects and cluster standard errors by 
group. (ii) we report marginal effects not conditioned on being censored. (iii) (robust standard 
errors). (iv) 
+ significant at the 10% level, * 5% level, ** 1% level. 
 
We now summarize our eﬃciency results. Socially reciprocal worlds provide
public goods more eﬀectively and more eﬃciently. There are two reasons for
this. First, because players will punish free riders outside their group, free
riders are punished more severely in socially reciprocal worlds. Second, our
players respond diﬀerently to punishment when social reciprocity is present.
Speciﬁcally, increased punishment has much more of an eﬀect on a free rider
22in the social reciprocity treatment. Perhaps, because they are punished more
severely, social reciprocity players are quicker to learn that free riding is not
acceptable.
7 Evidence Against Altruistic Punishment
S of a rw eh a v es p e n to u rt i m ed i ﬀerentiating social reciprocity from strong
reciprocity and because we focus on outgroup punishment, tit-for-tat reasons
for punishment have been controlled for in the design, but now we want to
concentrate on showing that the results we call social reciprocity can not be
explained by altruism either. We proceed by reviewing three pieces of evidence
against altruism. The ﬁrst bit of evidence is straightforward. Altruists would
never punish in period ten because no beneﬁts could follow for the other group
members, yet there is substantial outgroup punishment in the last period (recall
Figure 3).
While altruists would not punish outgroup on the last round, they may have
a reason to punish in earlier periods. We have two additional pieces of evidence
that suggest that the outgroup punishment that occurs in periods one through
nine is mostly due to social reciprocity. First, if we can tie the behavior of
those players who punish outgroup in period ten (social reciprocity for certain)
to their behavior in periods one through nine then we can say something about
who is most responsible for outgroup punishment during the rest of the game.
We calculated the Spearman rank order correlation between how much a player
punished outgroup in period ten and their propensity to punish outgroup in
periods one through ten and found ρ=0.42 (p<0.01).9 This correlation indicates
that the players who punished in period ten were also the ones who had higher
propensities to punish outgroup in the rest of the game. Hence, this suggests
that most outgroup punishment comes from social reciprocators, not altruists.
Second, we conducted a post-experiment survey and asked speciﬁcq u e s t i o n s
about players motives to punish other players. In one question we asked:
Which of the following sentences (if any) best describes your
actions:
a. I reduced the earnings of participants in the other group be-
cause I thought that in later rounds the earnings of participants in
9For each individual, regress one’s punishment decisions on how much the outgroup target







Figure 5: Stated Reasons for Outgroup Punishment (Social Reciprocators are
people who said they punished outside their groups to get back at free riders, in
general. Saintly Altruists are people who said they punished outgroup to help
others. Those categorized as Both answered aﬃrmatively to both responses).
the other group would be higher as a result.
b. I reduced the earnings of participants in the other group
because I wanted to get back at those who did not contribute.
c. Both a. and b.
d. None of the above. Please explain:
The only reason players responded with (d) was because they did not punish
anyone. Response (a) is the altruistic response and (b) is the social reciprocity
response. The responses were distributed according to the pie chart in Figure
5. Social reciprocators outnumber altruists four to one and those who report
being somewhat motivated by social reciprocity outnumber pure altruists ap-
proximately six to one.
We conclude that social reciprocity explains the majority of outgroup pun-
ishment. Tit-for-taters would never punish outside their groups, altruists would
never punish in the last period, those social reciprocators who punish in the last
period account for most of the outgroup punishment in the other nine periods,
and simply asking people why they punish outgroup reveals that social reci-
24procity motivations outnumber altruistic motivations at least four to one. The
existence of outgroup punishment and the eﬃciency gains to the community
generated by social reciprocity leads to the following interesting result. Our
data suggest that social reciprocity exists and is eﬃciency enhancing, but the
eﬃciency gains are largely an unintended by-product because socially reciprocal
agents do not necessarily punish with the purpose of increasing contributions in
the future.
8 Towards A Model of Social Reciprocity
Our experimental results provide considerable support, in both the statistical
and substantive senses of the word, for the proposition that free riders are pun-
i s h e db o t hw i t h i nand across groups. To provide some theoretical motivation
for our results - we do not pretend, however, that no other rationale is possible
or, in particular, that "prosocial preferences" cannot assume an important role
in this context - we consider a "miniature social reciprocity game" (hereafter,
MSR) consistent, in broad terms, with our experimental environment. Sup-
pose that, at each moment in discrete time, "nature" chooses a "punishment
network" of four individuals at random from a large (technically, inﬁnite) pop-
ulation and then divides each foursome into pairs. MSR is then played in two
stages. In the ﬁrst, each of the two pairs plays its own public goods or voluntary
contribution game, in which individuals must decide whether to contribute all
o rn o n eo ft h e i re n d o w m e n to f5 0E M U st oac o m m o np o o lw i t ha nM P C Ro f
50 percent. The normal form for each pair in the ﬁrst stage is therefore:
Contribute Free Ride
Contribute 75, 75 37.5, 87.5
Free Ride 87.5, 37.5 50, 50
In the second stage, the choices of all four are then revealed to all four,a f t e r
which contributors must decide (a) whether or not to enforce a "contribution
norm" and punish free riders and, if so, (b) which free riders - ingroup, outgroup
or both - to punish. We suppose, for purposes of simpliﬁcation, that those
who punish outsiders, the social reciprocators, cannot “pick and choose.” A
contributor, for example, who is also committed to "norm enforcement" both
within and across pairs and who is matched with three - one in and two out -
free riders must sanction all three. Each punishment act is assumed to cost a
contributor 10 EMUs, and to reduce a free rider’s payoﬀ by 20 EMUs.
25Consistent with the behavior that we observed in the lab, we further suppose
that individuals in MSR are restricted to ﬁve pure strategies or behaviors: free
ride and do not punish (F), contribute but do not punish (C), contribute and
punish (just) ingroup free riders (I), contribute and punish (just) outgroup free
riders (O) and contribute and punish both sorts of free riders (B).
We ﬁrst note that MSR has two symmetric Nash equilibria or SNEs. The
ﬁrst, in which no one contributes and, therefore, no punishment is ever observed,
is also MSR’s unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In the second, however,
the four participants randomize over the four contribution strategies, such that
pI +2 pO +3 pB > 0.625,w h e r epi is the likelihood that i = F,C,I,O,B is
played, and provides some support for the intuition that to deter free riding,
the expected punishment costs must exceed some threshold. (For a derivation
of this condition, see Appendix B.)
The second SNE is often dismissed, of course, because it fails the "backward
induction test," the reason that punishment is often considered anomalous: if
the punishment act is not costless, then no (implied) threat to sanction free
riders should be credible, in which case there will be no reason, absent some sort
of transformation of material outcomes into psychological ones, to contribute.
Punishment is observed, however, it cannot be rationalized as either con-
ditional cooperation or "strong reciprocity" in the sense of Bowles and Gintis
(2003). On the one hand, because the foursomes are dissolved at the end of
each period, no individual is ever matched, absent a measure zero coincidence,
with someone from a previous foursome of his or hers (In addition, under our
experimental protocol, it was diﬃcult, if not impossible, to tell who had pun-
ished whom, so it is not clear how much diﬀerence a possible rematch would
make.) Such punishment cannot be understood, therefore, in terms of the Folk
Theorem or the so-called "trigger strategies" that support conditional coopera-
tion in some environments. On the other hand, the fact that at least some of
this punishment is inﬂicted on outsiders implies that it cannot all be attributed
to strong reciprocity, as Carpenter et al (2004) have underscored.
Within the framework of the model, then, the question of whether some,
or even all, of the continuum of "all contribute" SNEs could meet some other,
perhaps less restrictive, requirements for equilibrium becomes critical. In par-
ticular, we are interested in whether what we have called social reciprocity is,
in a well-deﬁned sense, evolutionarily stable. We should therefore ﬁrst note
that, as we have formalized it, MSR is an extension of what Axelrod (1984) ﬁrst
called the "Norms Game," a framework since featured in the research of Güth
26and Kliemt (1993), Binmore and Samuelson (1994) and Sethi (1996). In Sethi’s
(1996) reformalization, two players confront the usual prisoner’s dilemma, after
which each is free to punish the other, at some cost to him/herself, no matter
what the other’s ﬁrst stage behavior. He then demonstrates that when each
of the (eight) pure strategies available is identiﬁed with a sub-population of
possible players, and a ninth sub-population, a set of best responders blessed
with perfect recognition, is added, there will be two evolutionarily stable states
(ESS) and one neutrally stable state (NSS). It is the ﬁrst, monomorphic, ESS,
in which "vengeful cooperators" comprise the entire population, that is most
relevant here, not least because simulation exercises, based on the so-called
replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker 1978), indicate that this outcome will be
locally stable and that its basin of attraction could be substantial.
If Sethi’s (1996) model provides a plausible explanation of the evolution of
strong reciprocity in some environments, it remains to be seen whether social
reciprocity can also sometimes survive selection pressures. Our approach here is
not based on the ESS criterion - indeed, it isn’t clear how ESS should be deﬁned
in this context (Broom, Cannings and Vickers 1997) - but rather the distinct
notion of drift compatible population states (Binmore and Samuelson 1999).
Our implementation is unusual, however, because we provide microfoundations
for both the selection mechanism and drift function in terms of "learning" or
"cultural transmission."
To this end, suppose that there are now ﬁve subpopulations associated with
each of the ﬁve pure strategies in MSR and, in a convenient abuse of notation,
denote their respective shares pF,p C, pI,p O and pB. To further streamline
the exposition, we shall refer to their respective members as free riders, sec-
ond order free riders, strong reciprocators, pure social reciprocators and social
reciprocators. The evolution of population shares over time is then assumed
to reﬂect two sorts of reinforcement-based learning, one more sophisticated and
more common than the other. We suppose that sophisticated learners "sample
and imitate" in the sense of Nachbar (1990), in which case the selection mech-
anism assumes the form of a scaled replicator dynamic, as conﬁrmed below.
The less sophisticated, on the other hand, are aspiration-driven as described
in Carpenter and Matthews (2001), where the diﬀerence reﬂects how available
information is, or is not used, either inside or outside the lab.
To be more precise, we suppose for the moment that time is marked in
discrete intervals of length ∆ a n dt h a ta tt h ee n do fe a c ho ft h e s ep e r i o d s ,a
fraction k∆ of the entire population re-evaluates their present situations. A
27proportion 1 − θ of these, where θ is small, will sample another member of the
population - that is, observe or somehow learn their behavior and outcome -
and to switch or imitate whenever (a) the sampled payoﬀ is higher and (b) the
diﬀerence exceeds some switch cost c, the value of which is a random variable
with uniform distribution over [0,¯ c]. To ensure the likelihood of a switch is
always less than or equal to one, it is further assumed that ¯ c ≥ 67.5. A propor-
tion θ, on the other hand, compare their current situation to some aspiration
level a, the value of which is also a random variable, with uniform distribution
over [0,¯ a],w h e r e¯ a ≥ 87.5. If one’s payoﬀ equals or exceeds this aspiration,
the individual does not switch, but if it falls short, he or she "experiments"
with another behavior. In the standard aspiration model (Binmore, Gale and
Samuelson, 1995, for example), the probabilities that behaviors are adopted are
assumed equal to their current population shares, but this implies that (a) these
shares are observed and this information is processed and, more important, (b)
the dissatisﬁed will sometimes "switch back" to the behavior that produced the
dissatisfaction, neither of which seems desirable to us. Instead, we shall use
am o d i ﬁed "no switch back dynamic" (Carpenter and Matthews 2001) here:
individuals who have fallen short of their aspriations are assumed to switch to
another pure strategy at random. It is this behavior that produces "drift" or
"mutation" in our model.
Under these assumptions, the share pi of the population committed to i
e v o l v e sa sf o l l o w s :
pi(t + ∆)=pi(t)+( 1− θ)k∆¯ c−1pi[
X
j6=i
pj max(0,πi − πj) − (8.1)
X
j6=i
pj max(0,πj − πi)] + θk∆¯ a−1[0.25
X
j6=i
pj(¯ a − πj) − pi(¯ a − πi)]
The second term, for example, is the net increase in the share of i at-
tributable to imitation. Of the (1 − θ)k∆pi percent of the population that
is committed to i in period t who also reevaluate their performance, a fraction
pj max[0,πj − πi] will sample someone committed to j 6= i whose outcome was
better. Given the determination of switch costs, it then follows that a fraction
(1 − θ)k∆pi¯ c−1pj max[0,πj − πi] of the population will switch from i to j 6= i
as the result of imitation, and that the total number of "defections" will be
(1 − θ)k∆pi¯ c−1 P
j6=i pj max[0,πj − πi]. In a similar vein, imitation will also
28cause a fraction (1 − θ)k∆pi¯ c−1 P
j6=i pj max[0,πi − πj] of the population to
switch to i.
The third term is the net increase in the share of sub-population i attribut-
able to the less sophicated form of reinforcement: the likelihood that someone
who is committed to j 6= i falls short of his or her aspiration level is (¯ a−πj)/¯ a,
which implies that a fraction θk∆¯ a−1 P
j6=i pj(¯ a−πj) of the population will be
dissatisﬁed with j 6= i, one quarter (0.25) of whom will then switch to i,a n ds o
on.
Since the bracketed expression in the second term collapses to the measure
of "diﬀerential ﬁtness" πi − ¯ π,w h e r e¯ π is the average payoﬀ for the population
as a whole, (8.1) can be rewritten as:
pi(t + ∆) − pi(t)
∆




pj(¯ a − πi) − pi(¯ a − πi)]
As ∆ → 0, we have the continuous time version of (8.2):
˙ pi =( 1− θ)¯ c−1pi(πi − ¯ π)+θ¯ a−1[0.25
X
j6=i
pj(¯ a − πi) − pi(¯ a − πi)] (8.3)
after time has been rescaled (k alters the speed of population shares on their
solution paths, but not the paths themselves).
In the special case where there is no drift (θ =0 )or aspiration-driven "mu-
tation," (8.3) is the standard replicator dynamic:
˙ pi =¯ c−1pi(πi − ¯ π) (8.4)
While our principal concern here is the behavior of (8.3), a brief discussion of the
evolution of shares in the absence of drift provides some important intuition. We
ﬁrst note that the expected payoﬀs for the four subpopulations of contributors
are a function of pF, the proportion of ﬁrst order free riders, alone:
29πC =7 5 − 37.5pF
πI =7 5 − 47.5pF
πO =7 5 − 57.5pF
πB =7 5 − 62.5pF (8.5)
Since punishment is not costless, it comes as no surprise that for a ﬁxed pF 6=0 ,
those who punish more do worse: second order free riders, who do not punish,
do better than strong reciprocators, who do not punish outside their group, and
strong reciprocators do better than either sort of social reciprocator. What is
unexpected is that the sometimes substantial diﬀerential between, for example,
second order free riders and social reciprocators need not drive the latter to
extinction. (This result does not turn, we should add, on the use of the
replicator dynamic as a selection mechanism.) To understand this, we observe
that the expected payoﬀ for ﬁrst order free riders or non-contributors is:
πF =2 7 .5+2 2 .5pF +6 0 pC +4 0 pI +2 0 pO (8.6)
after substitution for pB =1−pF −pC −pI −pO, which implies that ﬁrst order
free riders will, under some conditions, do worse than the social reciprocators.
In this case, ﬁrst oder free riders will sometimes be driven to extinction before
social reciprocators and if this occurs, no contributor does better than the others,
a n dt h es e l e c t i o np r e s s u r eo ns o c i a l reciprocators is eliminated.
Consider, for example, the situation in which the initial population is "bal-
anced" - that is, pi(t =0 )=0 .20 for all i. Second order free riders receive
75−37.5(0.20) = 67.5 EMUs on average; strong reciprocators, 65.5; pure social
reciprocators, 63.5; and social reciprocators, 62.5. First order free riders, on the
other hand, receive just 56, which implies a mean population-wide payoﬀ of 63.
As the result of imitation, some ﬁrst order free riders and social reciprocators
w o u l ds o o nb e c o m es e c o n do r d e rf r e er i ders, a smaller number would instead
become strong reciprocators, and a still smaller number would become pure so-
cial reciprocators. The ﬁrst order free riders are more vulnerable, however -
the likelihood that the payoﬀ diﬀerence will exceed the switch cost is greater,
in other words - in which case it is possible that their numbers will be driven to
zero before those of the social reciprocators, which would eliminate the latter’s
ﬁtness diﬀerential. Indeed, simulation of the RD from an initial balanced pop-
30ulation reveals that, in rounded numbers, pF =⇒ 0,p C =⇒ 0.34,p I =⇒ 0.26,
pO =⇒ 0.22 and pB =⇒ 0.18: that is, in the end, a little more than one third
of the population will contribute but not punish, but 40(= 22+18) percent will
be social reciprocators of one kind or another.
Two other properties of the evolution of population shares without drift also
deserve mention. First, it should come as no surprise that, for some initial
conditions, these shares will tend to an "all (ﬁrst order) free rider" equilibrium
in which pF =⇒ 1 and this is a desirable feature of the model: we do not always
see cooperation and norm enforcement, either inside the lab or out. Second,
the "all contribute" equilibrium is not unique: if the initial shares had been
pF(0) = 0.10,p C(0) = 0.15,p I(0) = 0.20,p O(0) = 0.25 and pB(0) = 0.30,
for example, the population would evolve such that pF =⇒ 0,p C =⇒ 0.18,
pI =⇒ 0.23,p O =⇒ 0.27 and pB =⇒ 0.32. It can be shown, in fact, that the
relevant attractor is a subset of the shares that correspond to the component of
mixed SNE in MSR.
There is reason to be concerned, however, that the all contribute equilibria
of (8.3) are vulnerable to random drift. It should be noted, however, that
while it isn’t diﬃcult to posit some "mutation" - the massive and simultaneous
transformation of all kinds of contributors into ﬁrst order free riders, for example
- that would undo such equilibria, shocks of this sort are implausible. Rather,
the issue here is whether or not the existence of small but persistent "noise"
will push the population far from this component and toward the all free ride
equilibrium. We are especially interested, for example, in whether outcomes in
which all four contribute constitute a "hanging valley" (Binmore and Samuelson
1999) that is consistent with medium run equilibrium. In mechanical terms,
our focus is on the behavior of (8.3) as θ tends to zero.
Closed form solutions to (8.3), expressed as a function of the drift paramater
θ,a r ed i ﬃcult (if not impossible) to obtain, however, so we report computed
(with Maple) solutions for three values of θ, 0.01,0.001 and 0.0001,w i t ht h e
relevant eigenvalues, in Table 4, for the case in which ¯ a =¯ c = 100.
31Noise Level
θ =0 .10 θ =0 .01 θ =0 .001 θ =0 .0001
p1 0.044554 0.004632 0.000464 0.000046
p2 0.295840 0.318817 0.321176 0.321411
p3 0.247643 0.258326 0.259423 0.259532
p4 0.212951 0.217130 0.217587 0.217633
p5 0.199011 0.201095 0.201351 0.201378
Eigenvalues -0.129493 -0.133335 -0.134637 -0.134777
-0.020147 -0.001695 -0.000166 -0.000017
-0.033345 -0.003000 -0.000296 -0.000030
-0.028186 -0.002497 -0.000246 -0.000025
p1 0.649904 0.976659 0.999772 0.999773
p2 0.158916 0.010281 0.001003 0.001000
p3 0.084318 0.005700 0.000557 0.000056
p4 0.057382 0.003943 0.000386 0.000038
p5 0.049478 0.003416 0.000334 0.000033
Eigenvalues -0.043534 -0.121120 -0.124628 -0.124963
-0.228658 -0.361696 -0.373634 -0.374864
-0.106535 -0.312956 -0.323839 -0.224919
-0.179235 -0.216488 -0.224182 -0.324885
p1 0.308332 0.019156 0.001857 0.000185
p2 0.337351 0.537293 0.551069 0.552410
p3 0.159996 0.207271 0.209367 0.209565
p4 0.104866 0.128402 0.129233 0.129311
p5 0.089453 0.107878 0.108474 0.108529
Eigenvalues 0.024470 -0.037671 -0.034198 -0.033810
-0.103800 0.005954 0.000654 0.000066
-0.083164 -0.003308 -0.000320 -0.000032
-0.029021 -0.005400 -0.000521 -0.000052
Table 4: Rest Points and Eigenvalues for MSR.
Table 4 reveals that under (8.3), MSR has three rest points, the properties
of which seem robust with respect to the amount of drift. (We are conﬁdent, in
other words, that the compositions of the population in the limit, as θ =⇒ 0,a r e
close to these.) In the ﬁrst, there are almost no free riders - in rounded numbers,
the proportion is 0.4 percent when θ =0 .01, and falls to 0.004 percent when θ =
320.0001 - and the share of second order free riders, those who contribute but do
not enforce norms, is about 32 percent in all three cases. Most important from
the perspective of both our experimental results and model, however, almost
42 percent of the population are social reciprocators of one kind or another,
and are therefore prepared to punish outsiders who do not contribute. This is,
therefore, our "reciprocal equilibrium."
The second rest point corresponds to the backward induction equilibrium
of MSR: the proportion of ﬁrst order free riders runs from 97.7 percent when
θ =0 .01 to 99.9 percent when θ =0 .0001, and no more than 0.7 percent of the
population ever punish outsiders.
The third is similar to the ﬁrst in the sense that there are almost no ﬁrst
order free riders, but there are also fewer social reciprocators - in each case, a
little less than 24 percent - and more second order free riders. As Table 4 also
reveals, however, this equilibrium is not stable: three of the four eigenvalues are
negative, but the fourth is positive. The fact that is also small, however, has
important implications, as seen below.
Figures 6 through 9 illustrate some possible solution paths. Figure 6, for
example, plots the evolution of shares from a position of initial balance - that
is, pi(0) = 0.20 for all i - for the benchmark case θ =0 .01, ¯ a =¯ c = 100.A s i n
the case of no drift, the population converges, rapidly, to the all contribute or
reciprocity equilibrium. (In fact, the limit values are not far apart.)
What forces ensure that this outcome is stable, despite the continuous re-
introduction of ﬁrst order free riders to the population? It is useful to decom-
pose the selective pressures that exist in this case. In the benchmark case, the
normalized ﬁtness diﬀerentials are:
pF(πF − ¯ π)=0 .004632(61.408880 − 74.708783) = −0.000616
pC(πC − ¯ π)=0 .318817(74.826300 − 74.708783) = +0.000375
pI(πI − ¯ π)=0 .258326(74.779980 − 74.708783) = +0.000184
pO(πO − ¯ π)=0 .217130(74.733660 − 74.708783) = +0.000054
pB(πB − ¯ π)=0 .201095(74.710500 − 74.708783) = +0.000003
In the absence of mutation, then, the representative ﬁrst order free rider does
much worse than all four sorts of contributors, each of whom receives more
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Figure 9: Falling Oﬀ a Plateau — the long run instability of the third equilibrium.
35population, the decrease in their numbers is a substantial one. On the other
hand, more than 60 percent of the free riders who switch as a result of imitation
will become contributors who (also) do not punish and another 30 percent will
become contributors who do not punish outsiders.
This in turn prompts the question: What prevents a population drift toward
these two behaviors that would in turn favor free riders? The answer is found in
the behavior of aspiration-based learners, which provides the required "oﬀset."




















pj(¯ a − πj) − p5(¯ a − π5)=5 .051406 − 7.760481 = −0.034186
As the numbers reveal, ﬁrst order free riders are the one subpopulation to
lose from imitation and to beneﬁt from dissatisfaction. No less important, no
contributors lose more unsophisticated learners than the second order free riders.
To elaborate, while the likelihood (38.6% or 100-61.408880/100 ≈ 0.386) that
the representative ﬁrst order free rider falls short of his or her aspiration level
exceeds that of the other four subpopulations, there are so few to start with that
the absolute number of defections is small. On the other hand, the probabilities
that a less sophisticated contributor will become disenchanted is smaller - from
25.2 percent for second order free riders to 25.3 percent for those who punish
both insiders and outsiders - but because all four sorts, in particular second
order free riders, are more numerous, the number of defections is also higher.
Furthemore, because one quarter of all contributors who are dissatisﬁed will
experiment with non-contribution, it is the ﬁrst order free riders who beneﬁt
most. Second order free riders, on the other hand, are hurt most because
more switch from, and few switch to, this behavior. Because the proportion of
aspriation-based learners is just one percent, these cancel one another out.
36In other words, the assumed nature of drift in this model implies that at
the all contribution equilibrium, there is a constant ﬂow of new ﬁrst order free
riders but because these non-contributors can expect to earn much less in an
environment where almost all others contribute, and a substantial number of
these are prepared to enforce contribution norms, there is also a constant, and
equal, stream of defections.
Figure 7 depicts the evolution of population shares from the unbalanced
initial condition in which ﬁrst order free riders comprise half the population
(p1 =0 .50), second order free riders another 20 percent (p2 =0 .20), and strong,
pure social and social reciprocators 10 percent each (p3 = p4 = p5 =0 .10). In
this case, there is rapid and almost monotone convergence to the no contribution
equilibrium.
Figures 8 and 9, on the other hand, illustrate one of the more "exotic"
possibilities that follow from the introduction of drift. The initial point is chosen
close to the third, unstable, equilibrium, p1 =0 .02, p2 =0 .54, p3 =0 .21,
p4 =0 .13 and p5 =0 .10, and Figure 8 plots the evolution of population shares
over the same time horizon as Figures 6 and 7, a period of time more than
suﬃcient to "settle down" in those cases. It seems that there is an almost
imperceptible drift in the population, from ﬁrst order free riders toward second
order free riders, and perhaps a plateau of sorts. Figure 9, which provides
a much longer run perspective on the same dynamics, demonstrates that this
conclusion would be premature: in short order, the share of ﬁrst order free riders
explodes, while the share of second order free riders, which exceed 50 percent,
collapses and, in the end, a stable no contribution equilibrium is established. In
this case, the model exhibits what is in eﬀect a régime shift, from a situation in
which almost all contribute to one in which almost no one does. While we did
observe a collapse of this sort in one or two experimental sessions, a "rebirth"
of the contribution norm also followed.
Given a ﬁxed value of θ, each of the stable rest points is hyperbolic, so that
small changes in the values of either ¯ a or ¯ c will have small changes on equilibrium
shares, but it is important to ask what would happen if, for example, one of
the parameters doubled in size. The issue is moot, of course, in the absence of
drift, since aspiration levels are (in this case, at least) irrelevant and the switch
cost aﬀects the speed of evolution but not its path. To this end, Tables 5 and
6 present some comparative statics for the model’s two stable equilibria.
37Switching Cost
¯ c = 100 ¯ c = 150 ¯ c = 200
p1 0.004632 0.006909 0.009159
p2 0.318817 0.317525 0.316247
p3 0.258326 0.257726 0.257133
p4 0.217130 0.216882 0.216638
p5 0.201095 0.200958 0.200824
p1 0.976659 0.964687 0.952496
p2 0.010281 0.015567 0.020958
p3 0.005700 0.008621 0.011593
p4 0.003943 0.005961 0.008013
p5 0.003416 0.005164 0.006941
Table 5: The Comparative Statices of Switching Costs.
Aspiration Upper Bound
¯ a = 100 ¯ a = 150 ¯ a = 200
p1 0.004632 0.009172 0.011406
p2 0.318817 0.316239 0.314967
p3 0.258326 0.257129 0.256538
p4 0.217130 0.216636 0.216395
p5 0.201095 0.200824 0.200693
p1 0.976659 0.968470 0.964291
p2 0.010281 0.013895 0.015741
p3 0.005700 0.007698 0.008717
p4 0.003943 0.005323 0.006028
p5 0.003416 0.004612 0.005222
Table 6: The Comparative Statices of Dissatisfaction.
The results show that when there is not much drift, the equilibrium shares
are not much aﬀected, even when the sizes of ¯ a and ¯ c double, from 100 to
200. Furthermore, the eﬀects on the equilibrium shares are consistent with
intuition. An increase in the value of ¯ c, for example, increases the amount of
"inertia": to induce the less successful to switch, the diﬀerence in outcomes
38must be more substantial. This in turn reduces the selective pressure on less
successful behaviors, which implies that their equilibrium shares will decrease,
and this is indeed what happens. In the reciprocity equilibrium, the proportions
of all four sorts of contributors become smaller - the diﬀerences, however, are
from the third decimal place onward - while the proportion of ﬁrst order free
riders increases, from 0.46 percent to 0.91. For the same reason, the share of
ﬁrst order free riders in the no contribution equilibrium falls 2.5 percent, to 95.2
percent, while the shares of all four sorts of contributors increase a little bit.
In a similar vein, an increase in ¯ a increases the likelihood that an individual
will fall short of his or her aspriation no matter how successful (in relative terms,
at least) their MSR outcomes, so that here, too, one would expect the shares of
"favored subpopulations" to decrease, and vice versa, and the results in Table
6c o n ﬁrm this.
To be consistent with our experimental data, however, it must also be the
case that contributors survive under more than some small and perhaps con-
trived set of initial conditions. That is, the ﬁrst equilibrium should be stable
and have a substantial basin of attraction. Given the dimension of (8.3), a
pictorial characterization is diﬃcult, and some sort of compression is needed.
To this end, Figure 10 plots the evolution of ﬁrst and second order free riders
for the set of initial conditions pF(0) = 0.1,0.2...,1 and pi(0) = (1 − pF(0))/4
for all i 6= F - that is, for the case where the initial shares of the four sorts of
contributors are equal. It shows that when the initial share of ﬁrst order free rid-
ers is less than 25 percent or so, reinforcement-based "evolution" will drive the
population to the all contribute equilibrium, but when the initial share exceeds
this, the population instead moves toward the no contribution equilibrium. In
some cases, the process is slow and exhibits the same sudden shifts illustrated
in Figure 9: on the path labelled A, for example, there is a sudden turnaround
in the fortunes of ﬁrst order free riders at time t1.
Figure 11 illustrates the evolution of the same two population shares under a
diﬀerent set of initial conditions, pC(0) = 0.1,0.2...,1 and pi(0) = (1−pC(0))/4
for all i 6= C, a condition that equalizes the numbers of free riders and each of
the three sorts of contributors who punish. In this case, when the initial share
of second order free riders is a third or less, ﬁrst order free riders almost vanish,
consistent with the intuition that for non-contributors to ﬂourish, the combined
shares of those prepared to punish such behavior must be smaller than some
threshold value. Otherwise, there is sometimes slow and roundabout evolution
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Figure 10: A View of the Basins of Attraction (pF is the fraction of free riders
and pi i st h ee q u a ls h a r eo fa l lt h eo t h e rs t r a t e g i e s ) .
The crucial common feature of Figures 10 and 11 is that the survival of reci-
procity, both strong and social, is not unusual or limited to a small neighborhood
of the all contribute equilibrium.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, may be
so eagerly pursued as to make knowingly neglect every consideration
of ease interest and safety? David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning
the Principles of Morals, 1751
This paper provides an integrated - experimental and theoretical - perspec-
tive on "social reciprocity," which we deﬁne as the willingness to enforce norms
with little regard to group aﬃliation or social distance. Furthermore, it shows
that such behavior should be distinguished from more familiar (conditional,
strong) forms of reciprocity, and also from altruism. In some sense, then, the




Figure 11: Another View of the Basins of Attraction (pC is the fraction of
unconditional cooperators and pi i st h ee q u a ls h a r eo fa l lt h eo t h e rs t r a t e g i e s ) .
but also, on the basis of the second stable equilibrium, the observation that even
villages will sometimes fall short of the mark.
We do not pretend, of course, that ours is a complete characterization, and
at least three possible extensions come to mind. First, at a conceptual level, the
paper considers negative but not positive manifestations of reciprocal behavior
but there are some environments in which the latter are more important. This
in turn underscores the need to consider more speciﬁc "frames" or situations.
How, for example, does social reciprocity matter in the workplace?
Second, at a theoretical level, the model is intended to serve as a point
of departure, and not a canonical treatment. The two sorts of learners in the
model, for example, are described as sophisticated and unsophisticated, but even
the former’s rule is a simple one, and it remains to be seen whether our results
extend to models with other, perhaps more elaborate, rules. It is possible, for
example, that under other rules, the evolution of shares would be consistent
with both the sudden collapse of contribution norms, as in our model, but also
with their rebirth, as we observed in some experimental sessions. The role of
social preferences or, for that matter, the "ordered beliefs" that characterize
41psychological games, also require exploration, not least their inﬂuence on the
determination of initial conditions.
Third, in terms of the experiment, it remains to be seen whether similar
results obtain with other subject pools - workers, for example — for which recip-
rocal behavior is more important.
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11 Appendix A: Experiment Participant Instruc-
tions
You have been asked to participate in an experiment. For participating today
and being on time you have been paid $5. You may earn an additional amount
of money depending on your decisions in the experiment. This money will be
44paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. When you click the BEGIN
button you will be asked for some personal information. After everyone enters
this information we will start the instructions for the experiment.
During the experiment we will speak in terms of Experimental Monetary
Units (EMUs) instead of Dollars. Your payoﬀs will be calculated in terms of
E M U sa n dt h e nt r a n s l a t e da tt h ee n do f the experiment into dollars at the
following rate: 30 EMUs = 1 Dollar.
In addition to the $5 show-up fee, each participant receives a lump sum
payment of 15 EMUs at the beginning of the experiment.
The experiment is divided into 10 diﬀerent periods. In each period 8 par-
ticipants are divided into two groups of 4. The composition of the groups will
remain the same for the entire experiment. Therefore, in each period your group
will consist of the same four participants.
Each period of the experiment has three stages.
Stage One
At the beginning of every period each participant receives a 25 EMU en-
dowment. In Stage One each of you will decide how much of the 25 EMUs to
contribute to a group project and how much you want to keep for yourself. You
are asked to contribute whole EMU amounts (i.e. a contribution of 5 EMUs
is alright, but 3.85 should be rounded up to 4). Your payoﬀ and the payoﬀ
of everyone else in your group will be determined by how much each member
contributes to the group project and how much each member keeps.
To record your decision, you will type EMU amounts in two text-input boxes,
one for the group project labeled GROUP ALLOCATION and one for yourself
labeled PRIVATE ALLOCATION. These boxes will be yellow. Once you have
made your decision, there will be a green SUBMIT button that will record your
decision.
After all the participants have made their decisions, each of you will be
informed of your gross earnings for the period.
GROSS EARNINGS
Your Gross Earnings will consist of two parts:
(1) Earnings from your Private Allocation. You are the only beneﬁciary of
EMUs you keep. More speciﬁcally, each EMU you keep increases your earnings
by one.
45(2) Earnings from the Group Project. Each member of the group gets the
same payoﬀ from the group project regardless of how much he or she contributed.
The payoﬀ from the group project is calculated by multiplying 0.5 times the total
EMUs contributed by the members of your group.
Your Gross Earnings can be summarized as follows:
1 × (EMUs you keep) + 0.5 × (Total EMUs contributed by your group)
Let’s discuss three examples.
Example 1: Say each member of your group contributes 15 of their 25 EMUs.
In this case, the group total contribution to the project is 4 × 15 = 60 EMUs.
Each group member earns 0.5 × 60 = 30 EMUs from the project. The gross
earnings of each member will then be the number of EMUs kept, 25-15 = 10,
plus the earnings from the group project, 30 EMUs, for each member. Hence,
each member would earn 10+30=40 EMUs.
Example 2: Now say everyone in the group contributes 5 EMUs. Here the
group total contribution will be 20 and each member will earn 0.5 × 20 =
10 EMUs from the group project. This means that the total earnings of each
member of the group will be 20 (the number of EMUs kept) plus 10 (earnings
from the group project) which equals 30 EMUs.
Example 3: Finally, say three group members contribute all their EMUs and
one contributes none. In this case, the group total contribution to the project
is 3 × 25 = 75 EMUs. Each group member earns 0.5 × 75 = 37.5 EMUs from
the project. The three members who contributed everything will earn 0+37.5
= 37.5 EMUs and the one member who contributed nothing will earn 25+37.5
= 62.5 EMUs.
Stage Two
In stage two you will be shown the allocation decisions made by all the
other participants, and they will see your decision. Also at this stage you will
be able to reduce the earnings of other participants, if you want to, and the
other participants will be able to reduce your earnings. You will be shown
how much each member of your group kept and how much they allocated to
the group project. You will also be shown how much each member of the
other group kept and how much they contributed to their group project. Your
allocation decision will also appear on the screen and will be labeled YOU.
46Please remember that the composition of your group remains the same during
each period and therefore every person in your group during this period will
also be in your group next period.
At this point you will decide how much (if at all) you wish to reduce the
earnings of the other participants. You reduce someone’s earnings by typing the
number of EMUs you wish to spend to reduce that person’s earnings into the
input-text box that appears below that participant’s allocation decision.
For each EMU you spend you will reduce the earnings of the other participant
by 2 EMUs. You can spend as much of your accumulated earnings as you wish
to reduce the earnings of the other participants.
Consider this example: suppose you spend 2 EMUs to reduce the earnings of
a participant in the other group, you spend 9 EMUs reducing the earnings of a
participant in your group, and you don’t spend anything to reduce the earnings
of the remaining participants. Your total cost of reductions will be (2+9+0) or
11 EMUs. When you have ﬁnished you will click the blue DONE button.
How much a participant’s gross earnings are reduced is determined by the
total amount spent by all the other participants in the session. If a total of 3
EMUs is, then this person’s earnings will be reduced by 6 EMUs. If the other
participants spend 4 EMUs in total, the person’s earnings would be reduced by
8E M U s ,a n ds oo n .
Stage Three
In stage three, you will be shown the total EMUs spent on reductions by
each other participant. You will then be able to spend an additional amount of
money to reduce the earnings of the other participants, if you choose to do so.
Again, for each EMU you spend you will reduce the earnings of the other
participant by 2 EMUs. You can spend as much of your accumulated earnings
as you wish to reduce the earnings of each of the other participants. When you
have click the blue DONE button.
Nobody’s earnings will be reduced below zero by the other participants. For
example, if your gross earnings were 40 EMUs and the other participants spent
50 EMUs to reduce your earnings, your gross earnings would be reduced to zero
and not minus sixty.
Your NET EARNINGS after the third stage will be calculated as follows:
(Gross Earnings from Stage One) - (2 × the number of EMU spent on
reductions directed towards you) - (your expenditure on reductions directed at
47other participants)
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, click the red
FINISHED button when you are done reading.
12 Appendix B: MSR’s Symmetric Nash Equi-
libria (SNE)
We shall ﬁr s ts h o wt h a tt h et w oc o m m o np r o ﬁles identiﬁed in the text are indeed
SNEs, and then show that no others are possible. The argument that the ﬁrst
proﬁle - that is, the case in which all four choose to free ride - satisﬁes this
criterion is trivial, so we shall focus on the second, in which all four randomize
over the four pure contribution strategies. Consider the common mixture σi =
(0,p C,p I,p OpB) for all i =1 ,...,4. There is no incentive for j to deviate to
some other mixture over the four contribution strategies - she would continue
























F −75),w h e r eπ
j
F is what j can expect to
earn as a unilateral free rider, and therefore that there will be no incentive to
deviate from σi if πj < 75 or, substituting in the previous expression, π
j
F < 75.
Under what circumstances will this condition be met? That is, under what
conditions can the unilateral free rider expect to receive less than 75? We ﬁrst
observe that she will earn 87.5 with likelihood pC(pC + pI)2 + pO(pC + pI)2 =
(pC + pO)(pC + pI)2,w h e r et h eﬁrst term is the product of the likelihood pC
that her partner will choose to contribute but not punish and the likelihood that
both members of the outgroup will either contribute but not punish or contribute
and punish insiders. Following similar logic, she will receive 67.5 with likelihood
2pC(pC +pI)(pO +pB)+pI(pC +pI)2 +2pO(pC +pI)(pO +pB)+pB(pC +pI)2,
47.5 with likelihood pC(pO + pB)2 +2 pI(pC + pI)(pO + pB)+pO(pO + pB)2 +
2pB(pC +pI)(pO +pB), and 27.5 with likelihood pI(pO +pB)2 +pB(pO +pB)2.
Gathering terms, we have:
π
j
F =8 7 .5pC(pC + pI)2 +8 7 .5pO(pC + pI)2 + 135pC(pC + pI)(pO + pB)
+67.5pI(pC + pI)2 +1 3 5 pO(pC + pI)(pO + pB)+6 7 .5p5(pC + pI)2
+47.5pC(pO + pB)2 +9 5 pI(pC + pI)(pO + pB)+4 7 .5pO(pO + pB)2




F =( pC + pO)[87.5(pC + pI)2 + 135(pC + pI)(pO + pB)+4 7 .5(pO + pB)2]
(pI + pB)[67.5(pC + pI)2 + 95(pC + pI)(pO + pB)27.5(pO + pB)2]
=( pC + pO)[87.5(pC + pI)+4 7 .5(pO + pB)][pC + pI + pO + pB]
(pI + pB)[67.5(pC + pI)+2 7 .5(pO + pB)][pC + pI + pO + pB]
Since pC + pI + pO + pB =1 ,t h i sc a nb er e w r i t t e n :
π
j
F =( pC + pO)[87.5(pC + pI)+6 7 .5(pI + pB)]
+(pO + pB)[47.5(pC + pO)+2 7 .5(pI + pB)]
=8 7 .5(pC + pO)+6 7 .5(pI + pB) − 40(pO + pB)
=8 7 .5pC +6 7 .5pI +4 7 .5pO +2 7 .5pB
It follows, therefore, that π
j
F < 75 if and only if:
87.5pC +6 7 .5pI +4 7 .5pO +2 7 .5pB < 75
or, since pC =1− pI − pO − pB in this case:
20pI +4 0 pO +6 0 pB > 12.5
or:
pI +2 pO +3 p5 > 0.625
which is the condition in the text.
The remaining candidates for SNE are those in which players randomize
over free riding and one or more of the contribution strategies. To show that
n o n eo ft h e s ea r ei nf a c tv i a b l e ,w en o t et h a ta t t e n t i o nc a nﬁrst be restricted to
strategies of the form σi =( pF,1−pF,0,0,0): if there is some positive likelihood
that each of the others will free ride, then proﬁles that sometimes call for the
punishment of free riders will fare worse than those that do not. The members
of this restricted set can also be ruled out, however, since in the absence of
punishment, contribution is dominated.
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